The relevance of irrelevant information in the dictator game by Ramalingam, Abhijit

Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 746-754
1. Introduction 
The standard dictator game involves two “players” - a dictator and a recipient. There is a 
predetermined sum of money, S (here $50), that can be split between the two players. The 
dictator chooses an amount 0 ≤ X ≤ S that he will allocate to the recipient. The recipient has 
no say in the split of the pie. The dictator is then paid S-X and the recipient is paid X. The 
equilibrium value of X is 0, with the dictator keeping the entire sum S for himself. However, 
many previous studies of the dictator game have found that dictators typically assign around 
20% of the pie to recipients (List 2007). This finding has been interpreted as evidence of 
agents' altruism. 
Further studies have found that dictators' altruism is not constant and that dictators assign 
significantly more or less than 20% when they are provided with relevant information that 
alters the game or subjects' perceptions of the game and/or the players. A number of 
experiments have tested the impact of information on property rights in the dictator game. 
Hoffman et al. (1994) conduct a dictator experiment where subjects take a current-events quiz 
prior to the game. The top performers were then assigned the role of dictators. They find that 
when dictators earn property rights over the pie to be divided, they “behave in a more self-
regarding manner” (p. 346). In a dictator experiment by Ruffle (1998) only the recipients 
took the quiz, performance on which determined the size of the pie to be divided by the 
dictators; the top performers created a larger pie. Ruffle finds that dictators punish poor 
performers. 
In Cherry et al. (2002), dictators determined the size of the pie by their performance on a quiz 
prior to the game. They find that when dictators split earned money with a recipient, 
allocations are significantly lower. In Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), either dictators or 
recipients take a quiz which determines the size of the pie, with superior performance 
resulting in a larger pie to be divided by dictators. They find that when the size of the pie is 
determined by the dictator's performance on the quiz, allocations are close to the theoretical 
prediction of zero. When the recipients “earned the wealth”, dictators allocated more than 
50%. 
Other experiments have explored the impact of information on the “deservingness” of the 
recipients in the dictator game, i.e., information on how much the recipients need the money 
or the likely use the money will be put to. Eckel and Grossman (1996) find that dictators 
allocate more to the Red Cross than they do to anonymous students. In a dictator experiment 
by Branas-Garza (2006), dictators are provided information about the wealth status of 
recipients, i.e., whether they are poor or not. He finds that dictators allocate more to poor 
recipients. A related experiment by Fong (2007) finds that dictators are conditional altruists. 
She finds that when dictators can allocate money to real welfare recipients, their choices are 
strongly influenced by their beliefs about the causes (bad luck or lack of effort or both) for 
the low endowments of recipients. 
In our experiment, we examine further the sensitivity of the dictator game to context and 
information. We investigate the influence on dictator’s allocations of information that has no 
impact on the payoff structure or on the endowments and “deservingness” of players. In our 
experiment, dictators and recipients first take a non-incentivized quiz which is graded and 
returned to them. Dictators are provided their own score and the recipients’ scores on the 
quiz. They then make multiple allocation decisions in dictator games that are unrelated to the 
quiz. Quiz scores do not impact any of the primitives of the game. The structure of interaction 
and payoffs is independent of performance on the quiz. In particular, subjects are not 
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assigned the role of dictator or recipient based on their scores. Each dictator makes multiple 
dictator allocations - one for each other subject in the session. In addition, each dictator is 
also a recipient in an equal number of decisions - once with each other subject. Further, the 
size of the pie is independent of quiz scores and is constant in each decision, here $50. Since 
subjects are not paid for their performance on the quiz, endowments are also the same for all 
subjects, here zero. Apart from quiz scores, no other information was available to dictators. 
Further, the experiment was conducted using a “near” double-blind procedure to minimize 
demand effects. Quiz scores thus represent information that is completely irrelevant for the 
game. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the impact of such irrelevant 
information on allocations in the dictator game. 
We find that the provision of irrelevant information about quiz scores does not have a 
significant “level” effect on dictators' allocations. Compared to when dictators' make 
allocations in the absence of any information, there is no significant difference in average 
allocations. However, we find that a large fraction of dictators in our sample pay attention to 
the magnitude of quiz scores when making allocation decisions. We find a significant 
positive relationship between allocations and the recipients’ quiz scores. Dictators reward 
good performance with merit-based financial aid. This is true even though quiz scores convey 
nothing about the game, the payoffs or the endowments of players. We thus find that 
information that is irrelevant for the game can nevertheless be relevant for decisions. Our 
results highlight the extreme sensitivity of the dictator game to information and to context. 
2. Experimental Design 
All sessions were conducted using paper and pencils. Instructions were handed to each 
subject and were read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects made multiple decisions with no 
feedback. Decisions were presented to subjects all at once. 
In our control sessions, each subject anonymously played a dictator game with each of the 
other subjects in his/her session in which he/she had to decide how to split $50 with each 
recipient. Subjects were given no information about any of the other subjects and simply had 
to record an allocation in each decision. These sessions were implemented using a double-
blind procedure and lasted about 45 minutes each.  
In our treatment sessions, subjects first answered a non-incentivised quiz with 20 multiple-
choice questions (10 verbal and 10 mathematics) taken, with permission, from the 2007-08 
Official SAT Practice Test. Following the return of their graded quizzes each subject 
anonymously played a dictator game with each other subject, as in the control sessions. 
Unlike in the control sessions, dictators were provided with their verbal, maths and total 
scores (one point per correct answer) and the scores of each recipient. The scores were 
presented in order of subject numbers and were not arranged in any particular manner. 
Subjects were not told of this and were not given any other information about other subjects. 
These sessions were conducted using a “near” double-blind procedure. A volunteer returned 
graded quizzes to subjects in each session. However, the volunteer had no access to quiz 
scores or experimental data and left the lab immediately after returning the quizzes. Each 
session lasted about 75 minutes. 
At the end of each session, a subject was randomly and anonymously paired with another 
subject in the session. Since each subject is a dictator and a recipient with each other subject, 
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any pairing ensured that both had played the roles of dictator and recipient in the pair.
1
 One 
was randomly chosen to be the dictator and the other the recipient. They were then paid 
according to the decision of the dictator in the pair. Each subject thus had an equal chance of 
being paid for his decision or for the decision of one other subject in the session. Subjects 
were informed of this payment scheme before making any decisions.  
Here, quiz scores do not alter the incentive or payoff structure of the game. They do not 
determine who the dictator will be – every subject is both a dictator and a recipient in 
multiple decisions – or the size of the pie to be divided. Further, they do not affect the 
endowment or need of players or provide any information about the “deservingness” of the 
final use of the money by any subject. Quiz scores thus represent completely irrelevant 
information. 
3. Results 
All sessions were run at the Interdisciplinary Experimental Laboratory at Indiana University 
with 92 undergraduate subjects. We ran two control sessions with 14 subjects each. Each 
subject made 13 decisions leading to a total of 364 observations. We ran five treatment 
sessions with 10 subjects in one session, 12 in another and 14 each in the remaining three. 
After dropping three individuals who did not understand the decision task
2
, we have 61 
treatment subjects and 731 decisions. No subject had participated in a dictator experiment 
before this. The average earning, including a $5 show-up fee, was $30. 
Table 1 summarises dictators’ allocations and subjects’ quiz performance.  
Table 1: Dictators’ Allocations and Quiz Scores 
  Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
  
 
Control 
Allocation 
(US$) 
364 12.912 11.281 0 50 
      
 
Treatment 
Allocation 
(US$) 
731 15.578 10.179 0 45 
Total Score 61 15.656 2.449 9 20 
Maths Score 61 7.803 1.711 4 10 
Verbal Score 61 7.853 1.447 4 10 
 
Table 2 summarises information on their demographics – age, proportion of women, 
international students and experience in at least one experiment.  
 
                                                          
1
 Korenok et al. (2010) test for the effects of role reversal and find no significant differences in dictators’ 
choices.  
2
 Two subjects only recorded one decision. One subject split $10, instead of $50, between himself and the 
recipient in every decision. Fortunately, their decisions were not needed for determining payments.  
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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects 
  Control Treatment 
Obs. 28 60 
Mean Age 20.07 years 19.27 years 
Women 32.14% (9/28) 36.67% (22/60) 
International 35.71 (10/28) 10% (6/60) 
Experience 25% (7/28) 11.67% (7/60) 
 
We only have only 60 observations in the treatment sessions since one subject did not 
provide demographic information. Figure 1 presents histograms of allocations in the control 
and in the treatment sessions.  
Figure 1: Dictators' Allocations in Control and Treatment Sessions 
 
As in earlier studies, dictator allocations are positive. On average, dictators allocated $12.91 
(25.82% of the pie) in the control sessions and $15.58 (31.16%) in the treatment sessions. A 
Wilcoxon test (z = -1.135, p = 0.257) indicates that there is no significant difference between 
average dictator allocations in the control and treatment sessions. Regressions (not reported) 
confirm this finding.  
We next investigate if information influenced dictators' choices in the treatment sessions. 
Figure 2 shows a plot of dictators' allocations against recipients' quiz scores.  
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Figure 2: Dictators' Allocations vs. Recipients' Quiz Scores 
 
The figure suggests a positive relationship between allocations and recipients' quiz scores. 
We estimate regressions of individual dictators' allocations on the scores of the recipient for 
the decision
3
 and demographic controls. Table 3 presents individual random effects (RE-ID) 
and tobit estimates of the regression (equations 1 and 2). We calculate robust standard errors 
clustered on individuals. To test for robustness, we also estimated pooled OLS and ordered 
probit (to account for clustering in the data - see Figure 1) models. The results are similar and 
we do not report these estimates. 
 
Table 3: The Effect of Quiz Scores on Dictators’ Allocations 
 
  Dependent variable: Allocation (US$) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  RE-ID Tobit RE-ID Tobit 
Recipient's Quiz 
Score 0.7799*** 0.7517*** 0.7794*** 0.7311*** 
 
(0.1649) (0.1965) (0.1649) (0.1939) 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Own Quiz Score - - -0.6461 -0.8439 
   
(0.5079) (0.544) 
   
[0.203] [0.121] 
                                                          
3
 Maths and verbal scores are highly correlated with the total scores and using them in the regressions does not 
change the results. 
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Age -0.4909 -0.9978 -0.6211 -1.1896 
 
(0.9138) (1.1832) (0.9191) (1.1947) 
 
[0.591] [0.399] [0.499] [0.319] 
Female 4.9652** 6.1999** 4.3662* 5.3804* 
 
(2.2726) (2.8042) (2.3347) (2.7908) 
 
[0.029] [0.027] [0.061] [0.054] 
International  2.5681 2.3738 1.8011 1.3774 
 
(3.1048) (3.9619) (3.1237) (3.9194) 
 
[0.408] [0.549] [0.564] [0.725] 
Experience -2.0883 -3.3181 -1.8766 -3.0033 
 
(3.8401) (5.0499) (3.9835) (5.1929) 
 
[0.587] [0.511] [0.638] [0.563] 
Constant 10.9711 19.9882 23.9226 37.6653 
 
(17.4183) (22.1698) (19.2609) (24.4928) 
 
[0.529] [0.367] [0.214] [0.124] 
     Obs. 718 No. of dictators/clusters = 60 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on 
individuals 
Figures in brackets are p-values for the two-sided tests of 
significance 
*** Sig. At 1%, ** Sig. At 5%, * Sig. At 10% 
 
We find that recipients' scores have a significant positive impact on dictators' allocations. 
Dictators' allocate between $0.75 and $0.80 more for each additional point the recipient has 
scored. On aggregate, dictators reward better performance on the quiz.
4
 
To test if dictators pay attention to differences in quiz scores, we estimate regressions of 
allocations on recipients' quiz scores, a dictator's own quiz score and demographic controls 
(equations 3 and 4 in Table 3). Dictators' own scores have no significant impact on their 
allocations; dictators do not look at relative performance on the quiz.  
We also test for individual variation among dictators. Eleven dictators (out of 28 – 39.29%) 
in the control sessions and 23 dictators (out of 61 - 37.70%) in the treatment sessions 
allocated the same amount to every recipient. Thus, approximately 60% of the dictators 
varied their allocations in both information conditions. 
We estimated OLS regressions (not reported) of allocations on a constant and the recipient's 
quiz score for each of the 38 dictators in the treatment sessions that varied their allocations 
across decisions. The allocations of 25 of these dictators are positively and significantly 
                                                          
4
 As is usual in dictator experiments (see Eckel and Grossman 1998), women allocated more than men did.  
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related to recipient scores: 22 at the 1% level, 1 at the 5% level and 2 at the 10% level. One 
dictator's allocations were negatively related to recipient scores at the 5% level. We thus find 
individual variation among dictators. However, a significant positive relationship between 
allocations and recipient scores holds true for a substantial fraction of dictators (25 of 61, i.e., 
40.98%). Further, the relationship holds despite the fact that quiz scores represent 
information that is irrelevant for the game. Our results thus indicate that information that is 
completely irrelevant to the game might nevertheless be relevant for decision making. 
4. Conclusion 
We used a modified dictator game experiment to test the influence of completely irrelevant 
information on allocations in a dictator game. Subjects took a SAT based quiz prior to the 
experiment. All subjects played in the role of dictator and recipient in multiple and 
simultaneous decisions. In each decision, the size of the pie was held constant at $50. Prior to 
making decisions, dictators were provided with his/her own quiz score and the score of the 
recipient for that decision. 
Like earlier studies, we find that dictators allocate significantly more than the equilibrium 
allocation of zero. We also find evidence for previous findings that women dictators are more 
generous than are men dictators. Our main finding, however, is that a substantial fraction of 
dictators do pay attention to recipients' quiz scores when making decisions. In particular, they 
reward good performance by recipients, awarding them merit-based financial aid. Quiz scores 
do not affect any aspect of the game or players and thus represent completely irrelevant 
information. We thus find that information that is irrelevant for the game might still be 
relevant for decisions. Our results highlight the extreme sensitivity of the dictator game to 
information and to context. 
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